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IN THE SUPRE11E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent

v.
THOMAS GARCIA,

Case No. 18126

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of Criminal Homicide,
Murder in the Second Degree, a First Degree Felony, in violation
of Utah Co_de Ann. §-76-5-203(a) (b) (c) (1953 as amended) in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Thomas Garcia, was charged by Information
with the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second
Degree, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-203(a) (b) (c) (1953 as amended).

On October 28, 1981

the appellant was convicted by a jury of the offense charged
in the Information.

On November 9, 1981 the appellant was

sentenced by the above entitled court, the Honorable Peter
F. Leary, Judge presiding, to five years to life at the Utah
State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant, Thomas Garcia, seeks reversal of the
judgment of guilt entered against him and a remand of the instant
case to the trial court for new trial.
STATE}IBNT OF THE FACTS
At trial, the evidence showed that in the early morning
hours of March 15, 1981, Officer Ryan Nielsen was returning
home from the University of Utah, where he is a police officer.
His attention was directed to a parked vehicle and three people
near the East High School parking lot on Sunnyside Avenue in
Salt Lake City.

In particular he noticed one of the individuals,

the appellant, was not wearing a shirt.

Officer Nielsen drove

past the vehicle, made a U-turn, and drove by again.

He again

saw the appellant, making eye-contact as he observed the appellant
pulling a body out of the vehicle.

(T.6)

The appellant appeared

to have blood on his person.
Officer Nielsen then drove west to a nearby Seven-Eleven
Store, to surmnon help.

The clerk there had earlier seen the

vehicle driving east on Eighth South (Sunnyside), apparently
having engine trouble.

While in the parking lot he saw the

vehicle in question proceed west on Eighth South Street, he
pursued it some eight blocks, when the three individuals seen
earlier exited the vehicle.
Officer Nielsen exited his vehicle.

He observed the

three individuals and immediately felt they were impaired by
drugs and/or alcohol.
the ground.

He ordered them to freeze and lie on

Two of the individuals (Mary Holloway and Charles
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Crick) did so.

The appellant lied down, but then ran and was

tackled by Officer Nielsen.

The officer and the appellant

wrestled on the ground (T. 13) during which time the appellant
allegedly threatened both the officer and a passerby whom the
officer had requested to call the police (T. 15).
two individuals in the vehicle left the scene.

The other

The appellant

was very agitated and wanted to fight.
The victim had been dead for sometime before his body
had been dumped at the East High parking lot.

Rigor mortis

had begun to set in, and the body was cold when paramedics
arrived.

Very little blood was present. (T. 39)

of death was fifteen stab wounds (T. 65).

The cause

In addition, the

body had ben beaten in the head with a blunt object, and showed
bruises on the hand consistent with very recent fighting.

Several

drugs, including phenobarbital, methadone, dalmene, diazepan,
and nordiazipan, were found in the blood, in therapuetically
substantial quantities, as well as an alcohol content of .19%
(T. 69).

The scene of the homicide was found to be an apartment
where Mary Holloway and Charles Crick resided (T. 82).
victim had been staying there temporarily.

The

Blood matching

the types of both the appellant and the victim, was found on
walls and a mattress.

The blood was diluted by attempts by

Holloway and Crick to wash it away (T. 97).

A knife, probably

the murder weapon, had been found near the body at the East
High parking lot.

-3-
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Diana Poor testified that she had visited the appellant
in jail

in mid May of 1981.

There, the appellant stated he

had fought with the victim when the victim mistreated a puppy.
He stated that he threw punches only.

Crick and Holloway then

joined in, beating the victim with a mug and numchucks (T 118).
The appellant denied stabbing anyone.

He also indicated no

one cared for him, and that he had no one, while Crick and
Holloway had each other and a future.

Therefore, Crick, Holloway

and the appellant agreed that appellant would take the blame
for the homicide. (T. 123)
On a second jail visit some two months later, appellant
asked Ms. Poor if she knew where his knife was, as he was afraid
someone might have taken it.

(T. 121)

Crick and Holloway were tried separately and convicted
of Second Degree Murder.

Both were called by the

State~

but in

effect but did not testify.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ERROR TO ADMIT HEARSAY AS TO APPELLANT'S ALLEGED
THREATS AFTER HIS ARREST.
Te~timony

~ustained,that

was received, over appellant's objection, which was

while appellant was wrestling with Officer Ryan

he threatened a bystander, whom the officer had requested to
summon the police, by stating:
"I wil 1 k il 1 you."

(T. 15)

The statement was clearly hearsay, inadmissible under
Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence.

Moreover, the eliciting of

such testimony painted appellant as an evil, violent person,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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likely or predisposed to commit murder, so that the introduction
of such evidence violated Rules 45, 47 and 55 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence.
Rule 45 states:
. . . the judge may in his discretion exclude evidence
if he finds its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the risk that its admission will
. . .
(b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice
or of confusing the jury, . . .
Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence
The alleged threats made during appellant's arrest were
irrelevant to the case.

Even if one assumes some minimal relevance,

the overwhelming danger of undue prejudice required excluding
such evidence.

The purpose of introducing such evidence was

to paint appellant as an evil, quarrelsome person; one who
would easily resort to deadly force, because he would easily
resort to verbal threats.
Such evidence misled the jury to the conclusion that
appellant was a man of violent character.

Under Rule 45 the

trial court's failure to exclude such evidence was an abuse
of discretion and reversible error.
The admission of such evidence also violated Rule 47,
which sets the standard for admission of character evidence,
when relevant, pursuant to Rule 46, except
. . . that (a) evidence of specific instances of
conduct other than evidence of conviction of a
crime which tends to prove the conduct had shall
be inadmissible, and (b) in a criminal action evidence
of an accused's character . . . (ii) if offered
by the prosecution to prove his guilt, may be admitted
only after the accus-ed has introduced evidence
of his good character.
Rule 47, Emphasis supplied.
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The admission of the evidence violated Rule 47 in two
respects.

A specific instance of bad conduct was admitted,

and it was not a conviction of a crime.

Further, appellant

never offered evidence of his good character.
Rule 55 was violated as well.

1
•

That rule states:

Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person committed
a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion,
is inadmissible to prove his disposition to conunit
crime or civil wrong as the basis for an inference
that he committed another crime or civil wrong
on another specified occasion but, subejct to Rule
45 and 48 such evidence is admissible when relevant
to prove some other material fact including absence
of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge or identity. Rule
55, Utah Rules of Evidence.

By its own terms, Rule 55 is subject to Rules 45 and
47.

Even if one assumes, arguendo, that the evidence did not

violate Rules 45 and 47, it was nevertheless not relevant to
prove any material fact of the instant homicide.

The evidence

was irrelevant to motive, intent , preparation, accident, mistake,
knowledge, or identity.

Nor was it relevant to impeaching

appellant's testimony (see State v. Goodliffe, 578 P.2d 1288
(Utah 1978) disucssed infra.)
In State v. Goodliffe,

supr~

iefendant had been convicted

of forcible sexual abuse of a six year old girl.

After the

State had rested, two of defendant's co-workers testified in
his behalf as to his reputation for truth and veracity.
testified in his own behalf.

Defendant

In rebuttal the State presented

evidence of three similar sexual abuse incidents, allegedly
perpetrated by defendant.

The Supreme Court of Utah reversed

defendant's conviction.
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"The rules of evidence require rejection of evidence
of specific behavior to prove a character trait
except conviction of a crime . . . .
[The record reveals that the trial court admitted
the evidence for the purpose of rebutting defendant's
evidence of his truthfulness and veracity]; yet
the clear implication of the testimony was that
it was an attempt to demonstrate defendant's propensity
to commit sexual crimes of the nature he is presently
charged with. . . .
The admission of such evidence without further
explanation could only have caused the jury to
speculate about defendant's propensity to commit
such crimes and confuse the issues, all to the
prejudice of defendant, which necessitates a new
trial."
(578 P.2d at 1290, original- emphasis)
In the instant case, the introduction of the alleged
threats was similarly an attempt to show that appellant had
a propensity for violent criminal acts, and was prejudicial
to him.

As the Court stated in State v. Green 578 P.2d 512

(Utah 1978)
" . . . in the interest of justice the defendant
is entitled to be tried on the charge against him,
and without having any prejudice aroused by attempting
to disgrace him, or show a disposition to connnit
crime."
(578 P.2d at 513-514)
The effect of such evidence as was here introduced was
to inflame and prejudice the jury and to deny appellant a fair
trial.
In State v. Dickson, 12 Utah (2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961),
the Court reversed defendant's conviction of robbery.

The

Court indicated that allowing cross-examination of defendant
as to details of a prior felony conviction was reversible error,
but apparently based its reversal on a "matter of graver importance."
During cross-examination of defendant, the prosecutor was allowed
Sponsored by the S.J.
Quinney
Library. Funding for digitization providedin
by the Institute
of Museum and
Library Services
to elicit testimony
of
a Law"disturbance"
Texas,
where
defendant
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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had been shot, and later charged, but not tried, on the offense
of being an accessory to a robbery.

The Court found the Texas

incident to be irrelevant to modus operandi.
" . . . the Texas incident would have no legitimate
probative value as to defendant's complicity in
the robbery charged here. It's only effect would
be to cast aspersions upon the defendant and to
imply that because he was involved in the Texas
trouble he is a person of evil character who would
be likely to commit such a crime as here charged.
The very purpose of excluding such evidence is
to prevent the prosecution from smearing an accused
by showing a bad reputation and relying on that for a conviction, rather than being required to
produce adequate proof of the crime in question."
(361 P.2d at 412)
State v. Kazda, 14 Utah (2d) 266, 382 P.2d 407 (1963)
is in accord.
In the case at bar the pro_secution has resor:ted to smearing
appellant with evidence of an isolated incident, taken out
of context, in order to gain a conviction.
State v. Putzell, 40 Wash. 2d 174, 242 P.2d 180 (1952)
is of interest, there defendant was convicted of first degree
murder.

Defendant, in addition to pleading not guilty, entered

a plea of insanity or mental irresponsibility.

The evidence

showed that defendant entered a tavern, approached deceased
and fired several shots, one of which hit deceased.

Deceased

then ran outside, got in a cab, and stated he wanted to go
to the hospital.

Defendant followed deceased to the cab, and

pulled deceased, as he lie on his back.
and disarmed defendant.

A police officer arrived

Defendant stated to the officer:

"Leave me alone. I have been after this guy for
a long time and I'm going to get him."
(242 P.2d at 182)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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At the trial, defendant testified in his own behalf.
He stated that some two years before the homicide, deceased
had assaulted him without provocation, and that deceased had
struck him on the head with a fire hose nozzle.

Defendant

stated that as a result of this assault, he was unconscious
for a period of some thirteen hours; that surgery was required,
~n

which pieces of skull were removed; that he had become extremely

nervous and unable to sleep; that he suffered blackouts, fear
of busses and planes; and that his head felt as though ants
were crawling in it and an iron band was exerting pressure
on it.
During cross-examination of defendant, he denied that
he had

car~ied

a gun on the night of the· assault two years

before the homicide.

The state rebutted over defendant's objection

with two witnesses who testified that while defendant had been
unconscious, they had removed a pistol and knife from his pocket.
The trial court held that the evidence was proper rebuttal
to defendant's testimony that he was a peaceful, lawabiding
citizen, and that it was not impeaching on a collateral matter.
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed.

The court

noted that defendant did not deny the shooting, and that his
main defense was lack of mental responsibility, caused by deceased's
previous aggressive attack.

The court recognized that it was

proper for the state to show that defendant, not the deceased,
had been the aggressor, but that the evidence which the State
had presented on that issue was not probative of it.

-9-
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" . . . such testimony was not relevant or material
as to the- issue of whether or not appellant was
the aggressor, and tended to invite the jury to
guess, speculate and conjecture."
(242 P.2d at 185)
As to whether the evidence was proper rebuttal to defendant's
testimony of his law abiding nature, the court noted that it
was defendant who had raised the

issu~

initially (unlike the

instant case), but held nevertheless that the state could not
rebut defendant's testimony by showing specific acts of misconduct,
stating:
"'No rule permits the general character of the
defendant, even when directly put in issue, to
be impeached by showing the commission by him of
a specific crime, other than the one for which
he is on trial."'
(242 P.2d at 18~)
A fortiori, when the character of a defendant is not
in issue, it is improper to attempt to show his bad character
by specific acts.
The court in Putzell, supra also held the matter to
be collateral and therefore inadmissible to impeach defendant's
testimony, whereas in the instant case, appellant did not testify.
Finally, (and perhaps most significantly), the court
stated:
"Conceding, for the sake of argument, that the
rebuttal testimony in question might have been
material, still it should not have been admitted
because its inflammatory nature so far outweighed
any materiality it might have had as to be prejudicial.
Here was a man being tried on a charge of first
degree murder. His defense was that he was mentally
irresponsible as the result of a prior unprovoked
assault on him by the deceased, and in which occurrence
he was not the aggressor. The state, to rebut
that contention, introduced evidence of finding
a gun and a knife in his pocket. The purpose of
that testimony was to portray him as a vicious,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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quarrelsome man. The very inflammatory nature
of this testimony leaves no margin for speculation
as to whether or not the jury was swayed by it."
(242 P.2d at 186)
In the case at bar, the testimony as to the alleged
threats, elicted on direct examination was also for the purpose
of showing appellant to be vicious and quarrelsome.

neither relevant nor material.

Note:

It was

The trial court here

sustained an objection to this evidence (T. 15), but nevertheless
the evidence was before the jury.

The evidence was clearly

inflammatory and prejudicial, and should have been excluded.
Since it was not, appellant was denied a fair trial, and is
entitled to a new one.
POINT II

ERROR TO ADMIT INFLAMI'.'1ATORY PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE VICTIM'S
BODY.
Numerous color photographs of the victim's body were
admitted into evidence over the objection of appellant.
In State v. Poe, 21 Utah (2d) 113, 441 P.2d 512 (1968),
24 Utah (2d) 355, 471 P.2d 870 (1970) the Court held the introduction

into evidence of color autopsy slides to be an abuse of discretion.
The introduction of photos of the scene of the crime was held
to be proper, where such photos were probative of several issues,
including defendant's presence at the scene, and the mental
element of a depraved mind.

In reversing, the Court noted:

"All the material facts which could conceivably
have been adduced from a viewing of the slides
had been established by uncontradicted lay and
medical testimony. The only purpose served was
to inflame and arouse the jury."
(441 P.2d at 515)

-11-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the instant case, the photos has no probative value.
The identity of the deceased was known.
was established by medical testimony.

The cause of death
The photos were probative

of no element of criminal homicide that was not provable by
other competent evidence.

The photos were not of the scene

of the crime, but rather where the body was found.

Admitting

the photos served only to arouse and inf lame the passions of
the jury.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania espoused a rule similar
to Poe, supra, in Commonwealth v. Scaramuzzio, 317 A.2d 225
(Pa. 1974):
"At the outset it should be noted that the practice
of admitting photographs of the body of the deceased,
unless they have essential evidentiary value, is
condemned."
(217 A.2d at 226, emphasis supplied)
" . . . they should not be resorted to where the witness can
clearly convey the facts to the jury without their
use. These slides were simply cummulative to the
pathologists' testimony as to the position, number,
and severity of the wounds."
(317 A.2d at 227)
The photos in the instant case were similarly cummulative
to the testimony of the police officers and the State Medical
Examiner.
The case of State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (1979), is
of interest.

In that case, as here, the cause of death was

not disputed, and established by medical testimony.

This court

stated:
We do not condone the admission of the photographs
in this case, since we are able to find no evidentiary
vlaue for the photographs other than the hopedf or emotional impact on the jurv.
(603 P.2d at 813, emphasis supplied)
-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In Wells, supra, while the court found error, it held
the error to be not prejudicial, because the photographs were
neither gruesome or offensive.

In the case at bar, the photographs

were both gruesome and offensive,
"such that there exists a reasonable probability
or likelihood that there would have been a result
more favorable to the defendant in absence of the
error."
(603 P.2d at 813)
The photos here were hardly of "essential evidentiary
value."

Indeed they were of no probative value whatsoever,

and went to not relevant or material issue which could not
be established by testimony.

Their only effect was to inflame

and prejudice the jury by the showing of a gruesome scene.
In such a case as here, where the evidence against appellant
is so minimal, they should have been excluded.

Their admission

denied appellant a fair trial.
POINT III
THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The evidence adduced at trial is set out supra in the
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.

In fact, no evidence exists linking

appellant to the murder of the victim, except that he was seen
pulling the victim's body from a vehicle, some time after the
death, and he admitted fighting with fists only, with the victim.
While there was blood on appellant's person after moving the
body, no one looked for blood on Crick and Holloway, who were
also convicted of the murder in question.

No evidence of a

conspiracy to commit murder exists.

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Clearly, the burden is on the State to prove the identity
of the murder.

State v. Green, 229 P.2d 318 (Wash. 1951). While

an inference of guilt may be drawn from concealing the victim's
body, that inference is "by no means strong enough of itself",
to warrant conviction.

Cagle v. State, 507 S.W. 2d 121, 129

(Tenn. Cr. App. 1973).
Cagle, supra, is closely on point.

There, the court

held the record supported the jury's verdict.

In addition

to evidence of the defendant's concealing the victim's body,
there was evidence of numerous inconsistent statements as to
the defendant's secreting himself in the victim's home, his
whereabouts when the murder occurred, his activities on the
days in question, his

~esigns

to have sexual relations with

the victim, and whether in fact he had sexual relations with
her.
In addition, he named as a "fellow employee" a man for
whom he was searching on the day in question, when in fact
no such person seemed to exist.

He stated he had been at a

hospital emergency room for treatment, yet no such record existed,
and no one employed in the emergency room ever saw him.

When

questioned by police, he inquired whether the victim's body
being found outside of the county would clear him.

(This was

before the body had been found and the police knew the victim
was dead).
The body was found in a quarry with strips of cloth
around the neck.

The victim had suffered blows to the head,

but the cause of death was strangulation.

It was impossible

to determineSponsored
whether
there had been a sexual as~,q11lr_
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The victim had bleached hair.

Bleached hair was found

in defendant's car.
At the time of defendant's arrest, he asked if the body
had been found.
While in jail, defendant had several times denied (to
other inmates) that he had killed the victim.
accounts of the incident would enrage him.

Reading newspaper

After reading such

an account defendant stated, "yeah, I killed the damned bitch."
He then went on to explain how he intended to bury the body,
but abandoned that plan when he throught he heard someone else
in the quarry.

He then inquired of his fellow inmates whether

the material around the victim's neck would yield fingerprints
after "so long".

Additionally, he stated he had not had sex

with the victim, and then said he had.
In the case at bar, however, there is the fact that
appellant pulled the body of the victim from a car, and his
statement that he had a fist fight with him earlier.

There

was also appellant's statement that following the fist fight,
Crick and Holloway set upon the victim.

The victim's blood

was found at Crick and Holloway's apartment, after Crick and
Holloway tried to wash it away.
matching the appellant's.
Crick and Holloway).

Blood was also found there

(No blood tests were ever run on

(T.100)

The condition of the victim's

fists was consistent with a recent fist fight.

Appellant had

asked, months after the homicide, whether his knife was still
in his effects, fearing that someone may have removed it.
This evidence simply does not rise to the level of proof
beyond a reasonable
doubt
appellant
committed
murder.
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Indeed, it indicates that the prejudicial impact of the erroneously
admitted photographs and alleged threats resulted in appellant's
conviction, and therefore said conviction must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's conviction was the result of the inflamed
passion and prejudice of the jury.

The enumerated errors in

Points I and II not only served separately to deny appellant
a fair trial, but they also worked in a cummulative fashion,
to the prejudice of appellant.
Because appellant was convicted on the basis of a bad
and evil character; and because of inflamed passions, and because
the State also failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasoanble
doubt, his conviction. must be reversed.
DATED this ~ \

day of June, 1982.

for Appellant
DELIVERED a copy o

foregoing to the Attorney General's

Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this

;l \

day of June, 1982.
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